Fond du lac Band Prevails (Again) before Eighth Circuit in Gaming Compact Dispute

Here is the opinion in City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa II:

City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 8th Circuit Decision

An excerpt:

We remand to the district court for its reconsideration of the Band’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and direct it to consider all of the factors outlined here and in our prior remand order. Accordingly, the district court must give proper weight to the congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming as well as other relevant factors we have previously identified. These include the facts that the City was on notice in 2009 of relevant actions and policies of the Gaming Commission and its warning in the 2011 Notice of Violation that the tribe would violate IGRA by making further rent payments to the city. As discussed in our prior City of Duluth opinion, such change in the governing law is also relevant to the question of whether an exceptional circumstance compels a grant of Rule 60(b)(6) relief. City of Duluth, 702 F.3d at 1154-55; see In re Pac. Far E. Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

Briefs are here.

Citizen Potawatomi Nation Demand for Arbitration against Oklahoma and Governor Fallin

Here:

2704764 – CPN-OTC Demand for Arbitration

An excerpt:

The Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Nation” or “Claimant”), a federally-recognized Indian tribal government, hereby demands arbitration of a dispute between the Nation and the State of Oklahoma (“Oklahoma” or “Respondent”). The Nation seeks:

(1) determination by an arbitrator under AAA Rule R-7 of the arbitrator’s own jurisdiction and the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement, which is part of the Dispute Resolution procedures within a Tribal-State Gaming Compact that the Nation claims to provide the exclusive means by which Oklahoma may enforce obligations set forth in the Compact;

(2) determination by an arbitrator of whether the Dispute Resolution (including arbitration) procedures of the Compact are the exclusive means by which Oklahoma may seek to enforce against the Nation’s Compact facilities the Nation’s duties imposed to comply with state laws governing sales and service of alcoholic beverages, as imposed by Compact Part 4(I);

Federal Court Dismisses Employment Suit against San Manuel

Here are the materials in Harris v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians (C.D. Cal.):

17-1 Motion to Dismiss

19 Opposition

22 DCT Order

Stop the Casino 101 Coalition v. Brown Cert Petition

Here:

Cert Petition

Questions presented:

1. Does the federal government have the unilateral power to alter California’s historic territorial jurisdiction and transfer that jurisdiction to an Indian tribe?

2. If the answer to the first question is affirmative, should a federal statute restoring tribal recognition and authorizing the United States to accept fee title to unspecified private lands within California’s borders be construed as transferring territorial jurisdiction from the state to the tribe when the statutory language is silent on that subject?

3. Can a state’s territorial jurisdiction shift by implication, or is an express, unequivocal acceptance of jurisdiction required under 40 U.S.C. § 3112?

Lower court materials here.

 

Update in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri

Here are the new materials in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri (E.D. Cal.):

60-1 Jamul Action Committee Motion for PI

62 Tribal Opposition to Motion for PI

63 NIGC Opposition to Motion for PI

67 Jamul Action Committee Reply

75-1 Rosales & Toggery Motion to File Amicus

75-2 Rosales & Toggery Amicus Brief

83 Tribal Opposition

84 NIGC Opposition

92 DCT Order Denying Amicus Motion

Previous postings here and here.

Decision in Tulalip Tribes v. Washington

Opinion here.

Previous coverage here.

Our conclusion is consonant with our instruction in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes that courts should hold compacting parties to the ordinary meaning of terms in their agreements. Id. at 1098–100. The plain language of the Spokane Compact shows that the Inter-Tribal Fund mechanism available to the Spokane Tribe carries with it interdependent conditions and consequences. Tulalip’s amendment would not match those terms. We take no view on whether the terms of Appendix Spokane are in fact more favorable than those included in the Tulalip Compact. We hold simply that Tulalip is not entitled as a matter of law to the more selective set of terms in its proposed amendment.2 The most-favored tribe clause does not allow a “pick and choose” arrangement. The district court correctly entered judgment for the State. Simply put, Tulalip’s proposal does not mirror the restrictions of Appendix Spokane, and those are the terms to which the State agreed.

Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Pro Se Employment Claims against Mohegan Sun Casino

Here are the materials in Tremblay v. Mohegan Sun Casino:

Tremblay Brief

Mohegan Brief

CA2 Summary Order

Federal Court Suit to Stop Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians’ Casino

Here is the complaint in Save the Valley LLC v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians (C.D. Cal.):

1 Complaint

Federal Court Confirms Labor Union Arbitration Award against Picayune Rancheria Casino

Here are the materials in Unite Here Local 19 v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (E.D. Cal.):

1 Petition

11-1 Unite Here Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

15 Chukchansi Opposition

16 Unite Here Reply

18 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Respondents maintain that the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) does not apply to them because the statute does not expressly abrogate tribal sovereignty. This Court, however, need not determine whether the statute abrogates sovereignty, as Respondents have waived their sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in federal court. See Okla.Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (“Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”) (emphasis added). The CBA-which, again, Respondents concede they agreed to—provides:
For the sole purpose of enabling a suit to compel arbitration or to confirm an arbitration award under this Agreement or the Employer’s Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance, the Employer agrees to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and consents to be sued in federal court, without exhausting tribal remedies.
Pet., Exh. A at 17 (emphasis added). There is no indication that Respondents entered into this unequivocal waiver involuntarily. See White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025–26 (9th Cir.2014) (“A voluntary waiver by a tribe must be unequivocally expressed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to Respondents’ suggestion, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014), does not compel a different result. In fact, that opinion reconfirmed that an Indian tribe may waive its sovereign immunity: “we have time and again treated the doctrine of tribal immunity as settled law and dismissed any suit against a tribe absent congressional authorization or a waiver.” 134 S.Ct. 2030–31 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and parentheses omitted); see also id. at 2035 (“[I]f a State really wants to sue a tribe for gaming outside Indian lands, the State need only bargain for a waiver of immunity.”).

Federal Court Rejects Gaming Bid of MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians

Here are the materials in State of Alabama v. 50 Serialized JLM Games (S.D. Ala.):

8 Alabama Motion to Remand

10 MOWA Motion to Dismiss

23 Alabama Response to Motion to Dismiss

31 MOWA Amended Notice of Removal to Federal Court

32 Alabama Surreply re Motion to Remand

36 Magistrate Report

39 DCT Order