Stop the Casino 101 Coalition v. Brown Cert Petition

Here:

Cert Petition

Questions presented:

1. Does the federal government have the unilateral power to alter California’s historic territorial jurisdiction and transfer that jurisdiction to an Indian tribe?

2. If the answer to the first question is affirmative, should a federal statute restoring tribal recognition and authorizing the United States to accept fee title to unspecified private lands within California’s borders be construed as transferring territorial jurisdiction from the state to the tribe when the statutory language is silent on that subject?

3. Can a state’s territorial jurisdiction shift by implication, or is an express, unequivocal acceptance of jurisdiction required under 40 U.S.C. § 3112?

Lower court materials here.

 

Update in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri

Here are the new materials in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri (E.D. Cal.):

60-1 Jamul Action Committee Motion for PI

62 Tribal Opposition to Motion for PI

63 NIGC Opposition to Motion for PI

67 Jamul Action Committee Reply

75-1 Rosales & Toggery Motion to File Amicus

75-2 Rosales & Toggery Amicus Brief

83 Tribal Opposition

84 NIGC Opposition

92 DCT Order Denying Amicus Motion

Previous postings here and here.

Decision in Tulalip Tribes v. Washington

Opinion here.

Previous coverage here.

Our conclusion is consonant with our instruction in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes that courts should hold compacting parties to the ordinary meaning of terms in their agreements. Id. at 1098–100. The plain language of the Spokane Compact shows that the Inter-Tribal Fund mechanism available to the Spokane Tribe carries with it interdependent conditions and consequences. Tulalip’s amendment would not match those terms. We take no view on whether the terms of Appendix Spokane are in fact more favorable than those included in the Tulalip Compact. We hold simply that Tulalip is not entitled as a matter of law to the more selective set of terms in its proposed amendment.2 The most-favored tribe clause does not allow a “pick and choose” arrangement. The district court correctly entered judgment for the State. Simply put, Tulalip’s proposal does not mirror the restrictions of Appendix Spokane, and those are the terms to which the State agreed.

Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Pro Se Employment Claims against Mohegan Sun Casino

Here are the materials in Tremblay v. Mohegan Sun Casino:

Tremblay Brief

Mohegan Brief

CA2 Summary Order

Federal Court Suit to Stop Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians’ Casino

Here is the complaint in Save the Valley LLC v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians (C.D. Cal.):

1 Complaint

Federal Court Confirms Labor Union Arbitration Award against Picayune Rancheria Casino

Here are the materials in Unite Here Local 19 v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (E.D. Cal.):

1 Petition

11-1 Unite Here Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

15 Chukchansi Opposition

16 Unite Here Reply

18 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Respondents maintain that the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) does not apply to them because the statute does not expressly abrogate tribal sovereignty. This Court, however, need not determine whether the statute abrogates sovereignty, as Respondents have waived their sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in federal court. See Okla.Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (“Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”) (emphasis added). The CBA-which, again, Respondents concede they agreed to—provides:
For the sole purpose of enabling a suit to compel arbitration or to confirm an arbitration award under this Agreement or the Employer’s Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance, the Employer agrees to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and consents to be sued in federal court, without exhausting tribal remedies.
Pet., Exh. A at 17 (emphasis added). There is no indication that Respondents entered into this unequivocal waiver involuntarily. See White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025–26 (9th Cir.2014) (“A voluntary waiver by a tribe must be unequivocally expressed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to Respondents’ suggestion, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014), does not compel a different result. In fact, that opinion reconfirmed that an Indian tribe may waive its sovereign immunity: “we have time and again treated the doctrine of tribal immunity as settled law and dismissed any suit against a tribe absent congressional authorization or a waiver.” 134 S.Ct. 2030–31 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and parentheses omitted); see also id. at 2035 (“[I]f a State really wants to sue a tribe for gaming outside Indian lands, the State need only bargain for a waiver of immunity.”).

Federal Court Rejects Gaming Bid of MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians

Here are the materials in State of Alabama v. 50 Serialized JLM Games (S.D. Ala.):

8 Alabama Motion to Remand

10 MOWA Motion to Dismiss

23 Alabama Response to Motion to Dismiss

31 MOWA Amended Notice of Removal to Federal Court

32 Alabama Surreply re Motion to Remand

36 Magistrate Report

39 DCT Order

NIGC Prevails in Dispute with City of Duluth over the Fond du Luth Casino

The D.C. District Court granted the NIGC’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the City’s APA challenge to the Fond-du-Luth NOV. Here is the order in City of Duluth v. National Indian Gaming Commission (D. D.C.):

APA case — District Court Op. (March 31 2015)

An excerpt:

Plaintiff City of Duluth, Minnesota, brings this action challenging a Notice of Violation (“NOV”) that the National Indian Gaming Commission (the “Commission”) issued to the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the “Band”) with respect to Band’s gaming establishment in the City of Duluth. This action is the latest step in a long saga pertaining to the relationship of the Band and the City of Duluth with respect to gaming, including proceedings in federal court in Minnesota, before the National Indian Gaming Commission, and, now, before this Court as well. In a nutshell, in the NOV, issued July 12, 2011, the National Indian Gaming Commission informed the Band that the 1994 Agreement between the Band and the City of Duluth violated the requirement that the Band have the “sole proprietary interest” in the gaming activity pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. The City of Duluth filed this action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that the NOV, first, was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law, and, second, exceeded Defendants’ authority under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The City of Duluth requests that the NOV be set aside and requests related declaratory and injunctive relief. The Federal Defendants—the Commission and Jonodev Chaudhuri, in his official capacity as Acting Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission—argue that the NOV neither was arbitrary or capricious nor exceeded the scope of the Commission’s authority. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s [24] Motion for Summary Judgment and the Federal Defendants’ [26] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s [24] Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS the Federal Defendants’ [26] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court concludes that the NOV was not arbitrary or capricious; that it did not exceed the scope of the Commission’s authority; and that none of the other legal infirmities that Plaintiff identifies are grounds for setting aside the NOV. Accordingly, this case is dismissed in its entirety.

Briefs are here.

Oklahoma v. Hobia Cert Petition

Here:

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (as filed)

Question presented:

Does Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014), require the dismissal of a State’s suit to prevent tribal officers from conducting gaming that would be unlawful under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and a state-tribal compact when

• the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief has been brought against tribal officials – not the tribe;
• the gaming will occur in Indian country, on the land of another tribe; and

• the state-tribal compact’s arbitration provision does not require arbitration before filing suit?

Lower court materials here.

North Fork Rancheria Sues California Alleging Violation of IGRA Good Faith Negotiation Obligation

Here is the complaint in North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California v. State of California (E.D. Cal.):

1 Complaint

An excerpt:

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) requires states, upon request by an Indian tribe, to “negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into” “a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities” on the tribe’s “Indian lands.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). IGRA also confers jurisdiction on this Court over “any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith.” Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). This action is brought pursuant to § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) and seeks a declaration that Defendant the State of California (“the State” or “California”) has failed to comply with § 2710(d)(3)(A)’s requirement that the State negotiate in good faith with Plaintiff North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California (“the Tribe”) to enter into an enforceable tribal-state gaming compact, and an order directing the State to conclude an enforceable compact with the Tribe within 60 days or submit to mediation, see id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)-(iv).