Here:
Petition for review briefs here.
Arizona COA materials here and here.
Trial court materials here:
Here:
Petition for review briefs here.
Arizona COA materials here and here.
Trial court materials here:
Here are the materials in Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Nash (D. N.M.):
52 — Pueblo Motion for Summary J
63 — Pueblo Reply to Judge Nash
An excerpt:
Specifically, the Court hereby enters a declaration that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. (“IGRA”) does not authorize an allocation of jurisdiction from tribal court to state court over a personal injury claim arising from the allegedly negligent serving of alcohol on Indian land, and further that the New Mexico State District Court does not have jurisdiction in the case of Gina Mendoza, Michael Hart and Dominic Montoya v. Tamaya Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Santa Ana Star Casino, CIV 2007-005711 (“underlying state court litigation”).
Prior federal court order and materials here.
Here is the opinion in Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino.
From the court’s syllabus:
Charles Sheffer, Jennifer Sheffer, and their minor son, J.S., were injured when their 18-wheeler tractor trailer collided with a rental vehicle leased to William Garris and driven by David Billups, both employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. They also sued the Buffalo Run Casino, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, and PTE, Inc. for dram-shop liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees’ actions under a theory of respondeat superior and did not negligently entrust the rental vehicle to its employees. The trial court also dismissed, sua sponte, the Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., and the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, determining that injunctions issued by the Honorable Lee R. West in the Western District of Oklahoma in Case No. 10-CV-00050-W and Case No. 10-CV-01339-W, prohibited suit for any tort claims against a tribe or a tribal entity. Plaintiffs appealed both orders, and we retained the appeals. In Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Co., 2013 OK 48, 306 P.3d 544, we reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Carolina Forge and found issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on both the respondeat superior and negligent entrustment claims. In the present case, we find the Peoria Tribe is immune from suit in state court for compact-based tort claims because Oklahoma state courts are not courts of competent jurisdiction as the term is used in the model gaming compact. We also hold that because Congress has not expressly abrogated tribal immunity from private, state court dram-shop claims and because the Peoria Tribe and its entities did not expressly waive their sovereign immunity by applying for and receiving a liquor license from the State of Oklahoma, the tribe is immune from dram-shop liability in state court. The trial court’s dismissal of the Peoria Tribe and its entities is affirmed.
Here. By Bill Wood.
In its latest pronouncement on the subject, the Supreme Court suggested in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies that tribal sovereign immunity is an accidental doctrine that developed with little analysis or reasoning. The Court, however, overlooked important history, context, and (some of its own) precedent which shows that the doctrine arose quite intentionally through relationships negotiated across centuries between the United States and the Indian nations involved in the foundational tribal immunity cases. Indeed, the doctrine’s origins and the principles underlying it date back as far as those for the federal, state, and foreign governments’ immunities, and, historically, the reasoning and justifications for these doctrines are the same. Although the Kiowa Court upheld tribal immunity, it did so grudgingly and only after disparaging its own precedent, misconstruing the doctrine’s origins, questioning whether to perpetuate it, and inviting Congress to abrogate it. In the wake of Kiowa, other courts have seized upon the Supreme Court’s marginalization of tribal immunity to limit the doctrine’s scope in cases where they do the job Kiowa said was for Congress and weigh the competing policy interests at stake. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these courts use Kiowa’s discrediting of tribal sovereign immunity’s legitimacy to tip the balance against tribal immunity. This article tells the real story of tribal sovereign immunity, providing doctrinal perspective and historical clarity in order to correct the misunderstandings about tribal immunity’s origins, development, and purposes.
Here are the materials in Martin v. Quapaw Tribe (N.D. Okla.):
Here are the briefs in White v. University of California:
Kumeyaay Cultural Repatriation Committee Answer Brief
Lower court materials are here.
Here are the materials in Carsten v. Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada (D. Nev.):
Here is the complaint in G2 v. Ponca Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma (W.D. Okla.):
An excerpt:
5. On March 1, 2010, the Ponca Tribe executed a “Construction Loan” in favor of G2 in the principal amount of $750,000.00, with a rider that all construction should be performed at cost plus 10%.
6. G2 performed all of its obligations under the Construction Loan contract.7. The Ponca Tribe had been substantially performing on this Construction Loan by making payments to G2 in the amount of $35,000.00 per month. See attached Exhibit 2.8. Despite G2’s notice of default and demand for repayment, the Ponca Tribe has defaulted on repayment pursuant to the terms of the Construction Loan. Said failure constitutes an event of default pursuant to the Construction Loan. The Ponca Tribe breached its contract with G2 by failing to make payments on the principal balance, and failing to otherwise cure the default.9. G2 has sustained damages in connection with the Ponca Tribe’s breach of contract.10. G2 has sustained damages and costs in connection with the Ponca Tribe’s continued use of its tax license, incurring fees and monies owed (OTC Case No. P-13-037-K).
11. G2 is entitled to recover damages it has sustained, including repayment of the remaining principal balance of $350,000.00, interest which continues to accrue, plus the expenses related to filing this action and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
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