tribal sovereign immunity – Page 77

The United States has filed an amicus curiae brief confirming that the trial court erred in disregarding the NIGC’s action. The United States confirmed that the state courts are required to defer to the agency’s views, as expressed in an NIGC opinion letter, the Chairman’s decision disapproving the agreement, and in the United States’ amicus brief, itself:

[T]he Superior Court was obliged to exercise its jurisdiction consistent with IGRA and IGRA’s bar on the enforcement of unapproved management contracts. Instead of acknowledging this bar and the need to resolve whether the ELA was an unapproved management contract (consistent with deference principles), the Superior Court simply denied the Tribe’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Chairman’s 2009 Disapproval was not “final agency action” binding on the state court. . . .

This is a non sequitur. A final disapproval decision by the NIGC is not necessary to render an unapproved management contract void. Such contract is and remains void unless and until the NIGC takes formal action to approve the contract. 25 C.F.R. §§ 533.1(a), 533.7. The NIGC’s disapproval of the ELA merely preserved the legal status quo. Thus, even if the 2009 Disapproval was invalid due to procedural errors – a question over which the Superior Court had no jurisdiction (see infra) – a ruling setting aside the NIGC’s decision would not resolve the preemption question.

. . .

[T]he present case involves the NIGC’s determination on a threshold legal issue involving an interpretation and application of the NIGC regulation defining “management contract.” The NIGC expressed its regulatory interpretation in the 2009 Disapproval and the 2007 OpinionLetter (as well as in the present amicus brief). The NIGC is entitled to deference in the interpretation of its own regulations, even when such interpretation is not rendered in a formal rulemaking or other final agency action.

Here is the United States’ brief and the parties’ briefs in response:

United States’ Amicus Brief

Sharp’s Response to United States’ Amicus Brief

Tribe’s Response to United States’ Amicus Brief

The merits briefs are here.

Update in Nooksack Disenrollment Matter — Second Amended Complaint Dismissed

August 8, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are additional materials in Lomeli v. Kelly (Nooksack Tribal Court):

Kelly Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Nooksack Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Kelly Defendants’ Reply on Motion to Dismiss

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 8-6-2013

An excerpt:

As Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Kevin Washburn wrote recently, “in the exercise of sovereignty and self-governance, tribes have the right, like other governments, to make good decisions, bad decisions, and decisions with which others may not agree.” Aguayo, page 1. The Tribal Council members named in this Complaint hold an obligation to act in the best interests of the Nooksack Indian Tribe. Membership and enrollment decisions impact individual lives in the deepest possible ways and those decisions cannot be taken lightly. This Court recognizes the serious implications of this case and its decision on this motion and all the others that have preceded it. It is the solemn obligation of this Court to follow the law of the Nooksack Indian Tribe and it is the obligation of the Tribal Council to do the same.

Nooksack Petition for Review in Sovereign Immunity Appeal

August 5, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here are the materials in the petition stage of Outsource Services Management LLC v. Nooksack Business Corp.:

Nooksack Petition for Review + Appendix

Answer to Petition for Review

Lower court materials here.

Federal Court Dismisses FLSA Complaint against Potawatomi Bingo Casino (Forest County)

August 5, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are materials from Smith v. Potawatomi Bingo Casino (E.D. Wis.):

DCT Order Dismissing Complaint

FCPC Motion to Dismiss

Split New Mexico COA Panel Holds Pueblo of San Felipe Not Immune from Land Suit (Case to Watch)

July 29, 2013Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the opinion in Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe. An excerpt from the majority:

Notwithstanding its purely facial attack and admission of the truth of the allegations of the complaint, including that the road is a state public road, the Pueblo argues that sovereign immunity bars the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Yet, the Pueblo offered no evidence of any property or governance interests whatsoever in the road or that the road, concededly a state public road, would threaten or otherwise affect its sovereignty. The Pueblo has not attempted any proof, for example, that even though the road is a state public road, a district court’s declaration of that fact would in any way undermine the Pueblo’s sovereignty or sovereign authority, infringe on any right of the Pueblo to govern itself or control its internal relations, or otherwise adversely affect its governmental, property, or treasury interests.

And from the dissent:

Third, “sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine that may be applied as a remedy depending on the equities of a given situation[, and,] it presents a pure jurisdictional question.” Armijo, 2011-NMCA-006, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Majority Opinion stresses that the effect of permitting the Pueblo to exercise tribal sovereign immunity would be to deprive Hamaatsa and other members of the public the opportunity for legal recourse. Majority Op. ¶ 16. The Majority Opinion even speculates that if tribal sovereign immunity were to apply, a pueblo or tribe could acquire property “virtually anywhere in New Mexico” and deny access to the motoring public and neighboring property owners. Supra. This speculation assumes that a property owner has the ability to convey a dedicated public road and extends far beyond the facts of this case. But, more significantly, although I agree that Hamaatsa makes a strong equitable argument, as this Court stated in Armijo, it is not relevant to the jurisdictional question before us. Id.