Author: Matthew L.M. Fletcher – Page 5

In the summer of 2016, a large fire, later known as the Dog Head Fire, engulfed Isleta Pueblo and United States Forest Service land in the Manzano Mountains of New Mexico. By the time it was extinguished, the fire had burned several thousand acres of land. The fire resulted from forest-thinning work performed by Pueblo crewmembers under an agreement with the Forest Service. The partnership to thin the forest arose after numerous fires had beset the surrounding areas.
Insurance companies and several owners of destroyed property (collectively, “Appellants”) sued the government, alleging negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Their negligence claims fell into two categories: the government’s own negligence arising from acts of Forest Service employees, and the government’s negligence arising from acts of the Pueblo crewmembers. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and, alternatively, for summary judgment on that same basis. The district court granted the government summary judgment. First, the court concluded that the Pueblo crewmembers had acted as independent contractors of the government, and thus, the government wasn’t subject to FTCA liability based on the Pueblo crewmembers’ negligence. Additionally, the court barred these claims under the FTCA’s administrative-exhaustion requirement. Second, the court barred Appellants’ claims premised on the Forest Service employees’ own negligence, under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception.
On appeal, Appellants contend that the district court erred in ruling that the FTCA jurisdictionally barred their claims. We disagree. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

Ninth Circuit Issues Decision in US v. Washington Subproceeding 11-02 [Lummi U&A]

June 4, 2021Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here.

Briefs here.

Ninth Circuit Decides Kalispel Tribe of Indians v. Dept. of the Interior

June 1, 2021Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here.

Briefs here.

SCOTUS Reverses in United States v. Cooley

June 1, 2021June 1, 2021Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the unanimous opinion from Justice Breyer.

An excerpt:

The question presented is whether an Indian tribe’s police officer has authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-Indian on a public right-of-way that runs through an Indian reservation. The search and detention, we assume, took place based on a potential violation of state or federal law prior to the suspect’s transport to the proper nontribal authorities for prosecution.
We have previously noted that a tribe retains inherent sovereign authority to address “conduct [that] threatens or has some direct effect on . . . the health or welfare of the tribe.” Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 566 (1981); see also Strate v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 456, n. 11 (1997). We believe this statement of law governs here. And we hold the tribal officer possesses the authority at issue.

Another excerpt:

More broadly, cross-deputization agreements are difficult to reach, and they often require negotiation between other authorities and the tribes over such matters as training, reciprocal authority to arrest, the “geographical reach of the agreements, the jurisdiction of the parties, liability of officers performing under the agreements, and sovereign immunity.” Fletcher, Fort, & Singel, Indian Country Law Enforcement and Cooperative Public Safety Agreements, 89 Mich. Bar J. 42, 44 (2010).

Here are the briefs and other background materials.