sovereign immunity – Page 72

Federal Court Applies Sherrill Defenses, Tribal Immunity to Dismiss Wolfchild Statutory Land Claims

March 6, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the order in Wolfchild v. Redwood County (D. Minn.):

196 DCT Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

An excerpt:

The Court finds no basis upon which to distinguish this case from those asserted in Sherrill or Stockbridge. It is clear that Plaintiffs’ claims flow from the 1863 Act. It is also clear that the land at issue here was sold to third parties no later than 1895. See Wolfchild IX, 731 F.3d at 1293. Plaintiffs’ claims are thus like those described in Stockbridge: “Indian land claims asserted generations after an alleged dispossession that are inherently disruptive of state and local governance and the settled expectations of current landowners and are subject to dismissal on the basis of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.” Id. 756 F.3d at 165.

There is no language in Sherrill or Stockbridge that would limit the holdings of those decisions to claims based on aboriginal title.

Based on the particular characteristics and history of the claims at issue here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are equitably barred. Application of the equitable bar set forth inSherrill does not require a balancing of equities between the parties. Instead, the equitable bar focuses on Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking relief, and the disruption that would result to settled and justified expectations regarding land ownership. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216‐17, 221(finding that “the Oneidasʹ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate”).

Briefs are here.

Massachusetts Gaming Claims against Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Survive Motions to Dismiss; Counterclaims Do, Too

March 2, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the updated materials in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) (D. Mass.):

65 Massachusetts Opposition to Rule 19 Motion

67 Aquinnah-Gay Head Community Opposition to 11th Amendment Motion to Dismiss

71 Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Reply in Support of Rule 19 Motion

72 Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds

77 Massachusetts Motion to Dismiss

86 Massachusetts Officials Motion to Dismiss

87 Wampanoag Tribe Opposition to Massachusetts Immunity Motion

88 Massachusetts Reply

95 DCT Order Denying Motions to Dismiss

An excerpt:

This lawsuit involves a dispute between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a federally recognized Indian tribe concerning regulatory jurisdiction over civil gaming on Indian lands on Martha’s Vineyard. The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) and related entities have taken steps to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal lands without a license from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth contends that operating gaming facilities without such a license would violate a 1983 settlement agreement that subjects the lands in question to state civil and criminal jurisdiction (and thus subjects them to state laws regulating gaming). Count 1 of the complaint alleges breach of contract, and Count 2 seeks a declaratory judgment.

The Commonwealth filed suit in state court on December 2, 2013. On December 30, 2013, the Tribe removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal-question and supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. On August 6, 2014, the Court granted motions to intervene by the Town of Aquinnah and the Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association (“AGHCA”). The Tribe has moved to dismiss the AGHCA complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; it has further moved to dismiss all three complaints (with leave to amend) for failure to join the United States as a required party.

On October 24, 2014, the Tribe filed an amended answer that included a counterclaim against the Commonwealth and counterclaims against three third-party defendants (all of whom are officials of the Commonwealth). Plaintiff and third-party defendants have moved to dismiss the counterclaims on the grounds of sovereign immunity (as to the counterclaims against the Commonwealth) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

For the reasons stated below, the motions of the Tribe will be denied and the motion of counterclaim-defendants will be granted in part and denied in part.

We posted motions to dismiss here. Materials on the state court removal and remand motions here. Complaint here.

Ninth Circuit Briefs in Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians — Whether Removal To Federal Court Waives Immunity

February 6, 2015March 17, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here:

Shingle Springs Opening Brief

Puyallup and Arctic Slope Amicus Brief

Bodi Answering Brief

Shingle Springs Reply

Lower court materials here.

State of Michigan Sues Sault Tribe Officials–Amended Complaint with Exhibits

February 4, 2015Kate Fort3 Comments

Amended Complaint

2Exhibit A (Letter from DOI)

Exhibit B (letter from Gov. Snyder to Chairman Eitrem)

Exhibit C (Sault Tribe Submission for Mandatory Fee-to-Trust Acquisition)

Exhibit D (Same, for the Sibley Parcel)

Exhibit E (Sault Tribe approval of development agreement with Lansing, MI)

Exhibit F (Comprehensive Development Agreement between Sault Tribe and Lansing)

Previous coverage of the Lansing casino case here.

Amerind Risk Management Corp. v. Blackfeet Housing — Complaint to Compel Arbitration

January 29, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the complaint in Amerind Risk Management Corp. v. Blackfeet Housing (D. N.M.):

1 Complaint

Supreme Court Cert Opposition Briefs in Stockbridge-Munsee Land Claim

January 28, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here (thanks to the Supreme Court Project page):

State of New York Brief in Opposition

Oneida Indian Nation Brief in Opposition

The petition is here.

RICA Suit against Payday Lenders Tangentially Involving Tribal Sovereign Lending

January 19, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the complaint in Bynon v. Mansfield (E.D. Pa.):

1 Complaint

An excerpt:

The defendants in this case are conspirators in a usury scam. The defendants charged plaintiff Breanda Bynon interest at the rate of 182.02% A.P.R. on a $5,000 loan. Ms. Bynon paid defendants about $15,000, but defendants applied all of the money to usurious interest and then repossessed her vehicle claiming nonpayment. Ms. Bynon files this complaint for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law (“Act 6”), 41 P.S. § 201 et seq., and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),

Another:

Sovereign Lending Solutions, LLC (“Sovereign”), is a loan company wholly owned by the Lac Vieu Desert Bank of Lake Superior Chippewa Indian Tribe (”Tribe”), and incorporated under tribal law. Sovereign originated the loan to Ms. Bynon, but is not named as a party because it is protected from liability under the doctrine of tribal immunity.

Federal Court Remands Choctaw Contract Dispute with its Insurer in Removal Action

January 14, 2015Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma v. Occidental Fire & Insurance Co. (E.D. Okla.):

15 Occidental Motion to Dismiss

17 Choctaw Motion to Remand

18 Choctaw Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

22 Occidental Reply

26 Occidental Opposition to Motion to Remand

28 Choctaw Reply

31 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Occidental characterizes the issue in this case as whether it may assert or waive the Nation’s sovereign immunity in connection with insurance coverage on a claim made on the policy. It has not been suggested that Congress provided authority for an insurer such as Occidental to abrogate, waive, or otherwise assert the sovereign immunity of an Indian nation through appropriate legislation. Consequently, the source of the waiver must be the Nation itself. The sole unequivocal statement of the relationship between the Nation and the insurers is the policy itself. Indeed, Occidental recognizes this fact by relying upon certain provisions within the policy to argue the Nation has specifically granted it a waiver or control over the assertion of sovereign immunity. The interpretation of the terms of the policy as a contract is governed exclusively by state law.