Here is the unpublished opinion in Lexington Insurance Co. v. Mueller.
Briefs are here.
tribal courts
ALI-CLE on “Business on Native Lands: Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Member Enterprises” @ Dec. 11, Noon
Here.
Business on Native Lands: Tribal Jurisdiction Over Non-Member Enterprises
December 11 | 12:00 – 1:00 p.m. ET
The coupon code FLETCHWEB will bring the price from $199 to $29.
Why You Should Attend
The scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-member business activities is a pivotal issue in contemporary law, as federal and state courts continue to define the limits of tribal authority. This webcast examines recent case law developments that may influence the regulatory and adjudicative authority of tribes over non-member enterprises.
If you do business with or on Indian Country, join us to explore how these rulings affect tribal sovereignty, economic development, and the relationships between tribal, federal, and state governments.
What You Will Learn
Whether you represent tribes, businesses, or government entities, this program offers essential guidance on this vital and developing area of law, including:
The foundational legal principles governing tribal jurisdiction over non-member business activities.
Analysis of recent federal and state court opinions shaping tribal authority.
Practical implications for businesses operating on tribal lands or engaging with tribal governments.
The interplay between tribal sovereignty and regulatory frameworks in non-tribal jurisdictions.
Attendees will be equipped with the tools to address complex jurisdictional questions confidently and effectively, ensuring compliance and fostering constructive relationships between tribes and non-member businesses.
Register today! Questions submitted during the program will be answered live by the faculty and all registrants will receive a set of downloadable course materials to accompany the program.
Who Should Attend
This course is ideal for attorneys practicing in areas intersecting with Native American law, particularly those involved in commercial litigation, land use, regulatory compliance, or business operations in Indian Country. It is also highly valuable for tribal legal counsel, public officials, and policymakers navigating the challenges of tribal jurisdiction. Educators seeking to deepen their understanding of these critical legal issues will also benefit greatly.
Minnesota Federal Court Acknowledges Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Off-Rez Marriage Dissolution
Here are the materials in Tix v. Tix (D. Minn.):
Tenth Circuit Oral Argument Audio in Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Wiley
New Student Scholarship on Oklahoma Choctaw Constitutional Interpretation
Crispin South has posted “Transplanted Rights in the Choctaw Nation: Threats to Sovereignty and Potential Solutions,” forthcoming in the Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
The constitutions of Federally Recognized Indian Tribes are varied, but nearly all contain a bill of rights. The Choctaw Nation’s Constitution, like that of several other Tribes, rather than specifically enumerating rights, instead contains a single catch-all provision, protecting the same rights available to citizens of the State of Oklahoma. Recently, the Choctaw Nation’s Constitutional Court adopted a broad interpretation of this provision, potentially allowing non-Tribal sovereigns, like the State of Oklahoma, to indirectly control the laws and public policy of the Tribe. This is a serious threat to the Tribe’s sovereignty, touching on issues of transplanted law raised by Indian Law scholars Elmer Rusco and Wenona Singel. To address this threat, the Choctaw Nation, and other Tribal Nations with similar constitutional provisions, ought to adopt a practice of selectively incorporating rights. Under this approach, only those rights fundamental to the Tribal structure of liberty and democracy would be incorporated, thus preserving the Tribe’s right to be different from the State, and the United States. Little has been written regarding these “transplanted rights” provisions in Tribal constitutions, and nearly nothing has been published proposing judicial and legislative solutions to the problems raised by these provisions. This note fills this gap in the literature by proposing judicially focused solutions, legislative solutions, and solutions involving constitutional reform.
Minnesota SCT Justice Anne McKeig to Visit MLaw This Friday
Justice McKeig will address the MLaw Native American Law Students Association and the Michigan Tribal-State-Federal Judicial Forum.
New York Federal Court Allows ICRA Habeas Petitions to Move Forward in Cayuga Banishments
Here are the available materials in Parker v. Halftown (N.D. N.Y.):
“Call for input of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers for the next thematic report on Indigenous justice”
Here:
Purpose: The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Margaret Satterthwaite, invites Member States, national human rights institutions, and other relevant State institutions, international and regional organizations, civil society, scholars, activists, and other interested individuals and organizations to provide written inputs for her next thematic report on Indigenous justice. The report will be presented at the 59th session of the Human Rights Council in June 2025.
NAICJA 2024
Looking forward to talking about tribal court jurisprudence, Brackeen, and Cooley:
Fort Peck COA Decides Dicey Indian Status Case
Here is the opinion in Jackson v. Fort Peck.
An excerpt:
Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to define Indian status for purposes of tribal court criminal jurisdiction in order to address the United States Supreme Court decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990). In Duro, the SCOTUS held that Indian tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Congress disagreed and passed federal legislation amending the Indian Civil Rights Act to recognize tribal inherent authority over all Indians who commit criminal offenses in Indian country. Unfortunately, for Indian tribes, Congress referred to the definition of Indian under the Major Crimes Act, 18 USC § 1153, in amending the ICRA. However, there is no definition of Indian under 18 USC § 1153 and the federal courts have generally used a federal common-law definition of Indian, first enunciated in United States v. Rogers, 45 US 567, 572, 4 How. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846), to establish Indian status for purposes of federal court Indian country jurisdiction. This has created a whole host of problems in the federal courts, see Skibine, Indians, Race and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 10 Alb. Govt. L. Rev. 49 (2017). As Professor Skibine notes in this excellent article, the federal courts, especially the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, are perplexed by this whole issue of Indian status for purposes of Indian country jurisdiction and have struggled with whether the definition is a race-based one, that could potentially run afoul of the 5th amendment, or is sufficiently tied to tribal status to survive scrutiny under Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (holding that disparate treatment of Indians is constitutional because of the unique political relationship Indian tribes have with the United States).
¶ 10 Tribal Courts are being dragged into this whole mess, apparently, because of the Duro fix and its reference to the Major Crimes Act. Whereas Indian tribes historically know who is and who is not Indian under tribal customary and common law, those customary practices may not be countenanced any longer under federal law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has been making itself a pretzel over this common-law definition that is the standard under the MCA and the ICRA. See e.g. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2009). However, other federal court decisions recognize that the first prong of the United States v. Rogers test for determining whether a person has some degree of Indian blood may be met by that person having native blood from a non-federally-recognized Tribe, See United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010)(en banc) (reversing panel decision finding that an Indian from the state-recognized Little Shell Band of Pembina Indians did not meet the definition of Indian under United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2005)) provided the person meets the second prong of the Rogers test for affiliating with a federally-recognized Tribe). See also State v. Daniels, 104 Wash.App. 271, 16 P.3d 650, 654 (2001) (having Canadian Indian blood meets the first prong of Rogers, but Court finds second prong was not met thus the Defendant was non-Indian and subject to state court jurisdiction).
Turtle Talk 
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