Bad River Ojibwe Petitions for Review of Wisconsin’s Approval of Re-Route of Line 5

Here is the petition in Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Resources (Wis. Cir. Ct.):

Blast from the Past: Governmental Attacks on Akwesasne News

From The Nishnawbe News [Northern Michigan University], May 1972:

Blast from the Past: Victoria Barner’s Suit against Michigamua and U of M

From Nishnawbe News [NMU], Summer 1972:

Ninth Circuit Affirms Rule 19 Dismissal of Maverick Gaming Suit

Here is the opinion in Maverick Gaming LLC v. United States.

Briefs here.

California Federal Court Dismisses State Law Employment Claim against Tribal Casino

Here are the materials in Ratcliffe v. Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation (E.D. Cal.):

Kekek Stark on Tribal Constitutions and Tribal Customs

Kekek Jason Stark has published “Exercising the Right of Self-Rule: Tribal Constitutions and Tribal Customary Law” in the Mitchell Hamline Law Review. PDF

Here is an excerpt:

In the context of the development and implementation of Tribal constitutions, Tribal Nations must ask themselves whether the federal government was playing a trick on Tribal Nations by imposing the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and its corresponding constitutions and Anglo-American governing principles upon Indian country. Are these documents and corresponding governing principles actually “shit,” dressed up as “smart berries” under the guise of making Tribal Nations “wise” in the image of Anglo-American law? Ninety years after the enactment of the IRA, it is time Tribal Nations become wise and return to traditional constitutional principles based on Tribal customary law and unwritten, ancient Tribal constitutions.

As always with KJS, highly recommended.

Oklahoma SCT Holds State ICWA Law [OICWA] Recognizes Fathers’ Rights

Here is the opinion in In re J.O.

Excerpt:

¶14 Rather than answer that question, COCA took a detour. Relying primarily on a United States Supreme Court case, COCA determined that, if Parker never had a relationship with Child, the requirements of ICWA Sections 1912(d) and (f) would not apply. As the trial court never made a specific finding regarding the nature of Parker’s relationship with Child, COCA ordered the trial court on remand to make that finding. COCA then concluded if there was no relationship the State would not have to make the necessary showings under ICWA. Parker petitioned for certiorari, arguing that COCA misapplied federal and Oklahoma law regarding ICWA. We agree.

¶15 The ICWA Section 1912 requirements are intended to respect and preserve the tribes’ interest in the custody and care of its children, and the detrimental impact to a child of placement outside its culture, in addition to and independent of any parental custodial interest. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49-50. Oklahoma adopted the Oklahoma ICWA (OICWA) to clarify state policies and procedures used to implement the federal statutory scheme. After Holyfield, the Legislature amended the OICWA policy statement to recognize that “Indian tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless of whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated.” 10 O.S. § 40.1. And the OICWA applies “to all state voluntary and involuntary child custody court proceedings involving Indian children, regardless of whether or not the children involved are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated.” 10 O.S. § 40.3(B). We presume that the Legislature was aware of the previous statutory language and intended these amendments to change the statutes accordingly. In the Matter of Baby Boy L., 2004 OK 93, ¶ 18, 103 P.3d 1099, 1105-06. Thus, under OICWA, whether a parent has a relationship with the child is not determinative of the tribe’s independent interest.

¶16 This Court reinforced this policy in Baby Boy L. There, the non-Indian mother refused father’s attempts to be active in the baby’s life and sought a non-Indian adoption outside the reservation. Indian father objected to the adoption, and the tribe intervened, moving to dismiss the adoption and seeking ICWA compliance. The trial court applied a doctrine called the “existing Indian family exception.” This doctrine, applied in a minority of states, requires that for ICWA to apply a child must be living in an Indian home, or already have a primarily Indian cultural heritage, or are otherwise somehow culturally “Indian”, rather than applying the federal ICWA definitions of Indian children. This Court, interpreting the OICWA amended language, concluded that through the amendments the Legislature had explicitly repudiated the “existing Indian family” exception to ICWA, and that exception could not be applied under Oklahoma law. Baby Boy L., 2004 OK 93, ¶ 18, 103 P.3d at 1105-06.

Sault Tribe Challenge to 1836 Treaty Consent Decree Heard in Sixth Circuit

Here is the oral argument audio (Ryan Mills for Sault Tribe).

Briefs:

Details on the consent decree here.

Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Haaland Cert Petition [all cert stage briefs]

Here:

Questions presented:

The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (“MILCSA”) established a Self-Sufficiency Fund for the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians to receive judgment funds that settled claims against the United States for the unconscionable taking of tribal lands. The statute, which codified a negotiated agreement between the Tribe and the United States, gave the Tribe’s Board of Directors exclusive authority over the Self-Sufficiency Fund, including determinations about the proper use of Fund capital and interest. The broad purposes for which the Tribe may expend Fund interest under MILCSA include the “enhancement of tribal lands.” §108(c)(5). And MILCSA requires the Secretary of the Interior to hold in trust “[a]ny lands” acquired with Fund interest. §108(f). The questions presented are:

  1. Whether Congress delegated to the Department of the Interior under MILCSA the authority to reject a mandatory trust submission based on the agency’s own view about whether the purchase of land satisfied §108(c), notwithstanding the statutory command that “[a]ny lands acquired using amounts from interest or other income of the [Tribe’s] Self-Sufficiency Fund shall be held in trust by the Secretary [of the Interior] for the benefit of the tribe.” §108(f).
  2. Whether “enhancement of tribal lands” in §108(c)(5) of MILCSA includes a land acquisition that adds to or augments the size of the Tribe’s total landholdings.

Lower court materials here.

Additional briefs:

cert_opposition

reply