Supreme Court

Allergan & St. Regis Mohawk Cert Petition on “Blocking Patent” Doctrine

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the petition in Allergan Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.:

Allergan & SRMT Cert Petition

Questions presented:

Whether the Federal Circuit erred in this case, as it did in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxanne Laboratories, Inc., 903 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2018), in holding that objective indicia of non-obviousness may be partially or entirely discounted where the development of the invention was allegedly “blocked” by the existence of a prior patent, and, if so, further erred by making an implicit finding that an invention was “blocked,” without requiring evidence of or making a finding of actual blocking, and in the face of evidence to the contrary.

 

Agency Cert Opposition Brief in Casino Pauma v. NLRB

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

nlrb-bio-3.pdf

Cert petition here.

Comanche Nation of Oklahoma v. Bernhardt Cert Petition [Chickasaw Gaming]

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the petition captioned Comanche Nation of Oklahoma v. Zinke [but presumably will switch to Comanche Nation of Oklahoma v. Bernhardt]:

Companche v Zinke Cert Petition

Question presented:

Whether the “former reservation” exception permitting lands acquired by the United States in trust for an Oklahoma Tribe after the effective date of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 to be devoted to gaming purposes, is applicable to lands not subject to Tribal jurisdiction prior to the acquisition.

Lower court materials here.

Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming Cert Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

cert petition

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Eighth Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with decisions of this Court and three other courts of appeals, that the possibility of filing a separate mandamus action was in and of itself “sufficient” to provide an “adequate opportunity” requiring Younger abstention, where plaintiffs had no opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the preliminary hearing procedure in the course of the state’s abuse and neglect proceedings?
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, in conflict with three courts of appeals, that the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to Younger abstention applies only to flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statutes, but not to flagrantly and patently unconstitutional policies, and in concluding that separating children from their parents for sixty days with no notice or opportunity to be heard inflicted no irreparable harm?

Lower court materials here.

Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio Cert Petition [Grand Canyon Mine; NHPA Consultation]

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

cert-petition-1.pdf

Question presented:

Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 54 U.S.C. § 306108, requires federal agencies to consult with Indian tribes and other interested parties to assess and mitigate the potential adverse impacts that a project requiring federal approval may have on sites of historic and cultural significance.

The question presented here is whether the NHPA imposes a continuing obligation upon federal agencies to engage in consultation under Section 106 when an agency maintains supervision of an ongoing project, and has the opportunity to require changes to mitigate adverse impacts after the initial approval.

Lower court materials here.

SCOTUS Decides Sturgeon v. Frost II

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion.

Materials here.

Update — footnote 2 of the majority:

As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit has held in three cases—the so called Katie John trilogy—that the term “public lands,” when used in ANILCA’s subsistence-fishing provisions, encompasses navigable waters like the Nation River. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F. 3d 698 (1995); John v. United States, 247 F. 3d 1032 (2001) (en banc); John v. United States, 720 F. 3d 1214 (2013); supra, at 12. Those provisions are not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb the Ninth Circuit’s holdings that the Park Service may regulate subsistence fishing on navigable waters. See generally Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae 29–35 (arguing that this case does not implicate those decisions); Brief for Ahtna, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 30–36 (same). 

Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians Cert Petition [Bankruptcy Code + Sovereign Immunity]

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

buchwald cert petition

Question presented:

Whether the Bankruptcy Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes.

Lower court materials here.

Split SCOTUS Affirms Cougar Den (5-4, no majority opinion)

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion.

Materials are here.

Teck Metals v. Colville Cert Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the petition in Teck Metals Ltd. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (No. 18-1160):

cert-petition.pdf

Update:

state-of-washington-bio.pdf

colville-tribes-bio.pdf

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit, in conflict with Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), correctly concluded that holding Teck liable for its discharges in Canada was not an impermissible extraterritorial application of CERCLA.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit, in conflict with this Court’s decision in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014), and the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, correctly held that a State may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant because the defendant knew its conduct would have in-state effects, where the defendant’s relevant conduct occurred elsewhere.

3. Whether the Ninth Circuit, in conflict with the First Circuit and in tension with the opinions of this Court and several other circuits, correctly held that a defendant can be an “arranger” under CERCLA even if the defendant did not arrange for anyone else to dispose of or treat the waste.

Lower court materials here.

Wilson v. Horton’s Towing Cert Petition [Montana; Exhaustion; Civil Forfeiture]

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here:

Cert Petition

Questions presented:

1. Does an Indian Tribe have authority under the second exception of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), to forfeit automobiles owned by non Native Americans for violation of tribal drug laws while on tribal land?

2. If so, does the Tribe have authority to seize a motor vehicle off reservation if it has probable cause to believe that the automobile previously contained illegal drugs while on tribal lands?

Lower court materials here.