Here is the order in Tulalip Tribes v. State of Washington:
2015-05-28 Dkt #57 Denial of Pet for Rehearing En Banc
En banc petition here.
Here is the order in Tulalip Tribes v. State of Washington:
2015-05-28 Dkt #57 Denial of Pet for Rehearing En Banc
En banc petition here.
Here is the opinion in Cosentino v. Fuller:
An excerpt:
For sovereign immunity to apply, the claims against tribal officials must be based on actions the officials took in their official capacity and within the scope of their official authority. An official’s actions that exceed the scope of his or her authority are not protected. Although the parties do not dispute that as members of the tribe’s gaming commission Defendants had the authority to revoke a gaming license if they received reliable information the licensee no longer satisfied the requirements for obtaining a license or had engaged in conduct that reflected poorly upon the tribe or its gaming activities, the record lacks evidence showing Defendants received any such information about Cosentino or an explanation of why they revoked his gaming license. Cosentino, however, presented evidence supporting his claim Defendants exceeded the scope of their authority by revoking his license without cause and in retaliation against him. Sovereign immunity prevents us from inquiring into the reliability of information Defendants may have relied upon in revoking Cosentino’s license or any other errors they may have made, but it does not prevent inquiry into whether Defendants exceeded their authority by using their official position to intentionally harm Cosentino.
Materials in a related Ninth Circuit matter are here.
Here is the unpublished opinion in La Cuna De Aztlan Sacred Sites Protection Circle Advisory Committee v. Dept. of Interior.
An excerpt:
We conclude that the record, which includes declarations submitted by the Plaintiffs that provide little more than conclusory statements and which have not shown where the alleged sacred sites are located at the Ivanpah Project site, is insufficient to support Plaintiffs’ claim that the loss of access to the limited area taken by the Ivanpah Project imposes a substantial burden. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have not shown that they are either “forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit,” or “coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions” as this court requires to establish a substantial burden under RFRA.
Briefs and lower court materials are here.
Here are the materials in Blue Lake Rancheria v. Lanier (E.D. Cal.):
82-1 Blue Lake Motion for Summary J
Here is the petition in Tulalip Tribes v. State of Washington:
Here are the opening briefs in National Mining Assn. v. Jewell:
16 – Open Brief – no Addendum (Quaterra)
18 – Open Brief & Addendum (NMA)
29 – Utah, AZ, NV, MT – Amicus in Favor of Reversal
Opinion here.
Previous coverage here.
Our conclusion is consonant with our instruction in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes that courts should hold compacting parties to the ordinary meaning of terms in their agreements. Id. at 1098–100. The plain language of the Spokane Compact shows that the Inter-Tribal Fund mechanism available to the Spokane Tribe carries with it interdependent conditions and consequences. Tulalip’s amendment would not match those terms. We take no view on whether the terms of Appendix Spokane are in fact more favorable than those included in the Tulalip Compact. We hold simply that Tulalip is not entitled as a matter of law to the more selective set of terms in its proposed amendment.2 The most-favored tribe clause does not allow a “pick and choose” arrangement. The district court correctly entered judgment for the State. Simply put, Tulalip’s proposal does not mirror the restrictions of Appendix Spokane, and those are the terms to which the State agreed.
Here:
Environmental Groups Opening Brief
A second appeal involving the Hopi Tribe’s challenge has been severed from this consolidated appeal:
Here is the opinion in Crow Tribal Housing Authority v. HUD.
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel vacated the district court’s order remanding the case to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) for a hearing, reversed the judgment, and remanded for judgment to be entered in favor of HUD in a case brought by the Crow Tribal Housing Authority, arising from a dispute involving Indian housing block grants made under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996.
The panel held that the district court erred in ruling that HUD violated Crow Housing’s right to Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996’s notice and reporting requirements under 25 U.S.C. §§ 4161 and 4165.
Specifically, the panel concluded that HUD did not act under § 4161, and accordingly, could not have violated a hearing requirement under that section. The panel further concluded that HUD’s actions triggered the opportunity for a hearing under § 4165 when it conducted an on-site review of Crow Housing in August 2004. Finally, the panel held that because Crow Housing did not request a hearing, HUD did not violate its statutory obligation under § 4165 and did not improperly deprive Crow Housing of a hearing under the facts of the case.
Briefs and materials are here.
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