Does Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014), require the dismissal of a State’s suit to prevent tribal officers from conducting gaming that would be unlawful under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and a state-tribal compact when
• the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief has been brought against tribal officials – not the tribe;
• the gaming will occur in Indian country, on the land of another tribe; and
• the state-tribal compact’s arbitration provision does not require arbitration before filing suit?
Having established subject-matter jurisdiction and the joinder of all necessary parties, the court finds that Navajo Nation has provided “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). It has thus satisfied the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(c) further states that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed–but early enough not to delay trial–a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The court finds no basis on which San Juan County would be entitled to judgment on the merits on the basis of this briefing.
Here are the materials in Diné Citizens against Ruining Our Environment v. United States Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (D. Colo.):
The Nation is an indispensible party under Rule 19(b). As discussed above, a judgment in Comenout’s favor would prejudice the Nation’s contractual rights under the lease. Comenout also cannot be accorded complete relief in the Nation’s absence because any injunction would not be binding on the Nation. Further, the relief sought by Comenout cannot be shaped to lessen the potential prejudice to either Comenout or the Nation. Partial relief is also inadequate, because the Nation could still attempt to enforce its rights to use the property for commercial purposes as the lessee.
The Court finds no basis upon which to distinguish this case from those asserted in Sherrill or Stockbridge. It is clear that Plaintiffs’ claims flow from the 1863 Act. It is also clear that the land at issue here was sold to third parties no later than 1895. See Wolfchild IX, 731 F.3d at 1293. Plaintiffs’ claims are thus like those described in Stockbridge: “Indian land claims asserted generations after an alleged dispossession that are inherently disruptive of state and local governance and the settled expectations of current landowners and are subject to dismissal on the basis of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.” Id. 756 F.3d at 165.
There is no language in Sherrill or Stockbridge that would limit the holdings of those decisionsto claims based on aboriginal title.
Based on the particular characteristics and history of the claims at issue here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are equitably barred. Application of the equitable bar set forth inSherrill does not require a balancing of equities between the parties. Instead, the equitable bar focuses on Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking relief, and the disruption that would result to settled and justified expectations regarding land ownership. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216‐17, 221(finding that “the Oneidasʹ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate”).
This lawsuit involves a dispute between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a federally recognized Indian tribe concerningregulatory jurisdiction over civil gaming on Indian lands on Martha’s Vineyard. The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) and related entities have taken steps to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal lands without a license from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth contends that operating gaming facilities without such a license would violate a 1983 settlement agreement that subjects the lands in question to state civil and criminal jurisdiction (and thus subjects them to state laws regulating gaming). Count 1 of the complaint alleges breach of contract, and Count 2 seeks a declaratory judgment.
The Commonwealth filed suit in state court on December 2, 2013. On December 30, 2013, the Tribe removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal-question and supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. On August 6, 2014, the Court granted motions to intervene by the Town of Aquinnah and the Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association (“AGHCA”). The Tribe has moved to dismiss the AGHCA complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; it has further moved to dismiss all three complaints (with leave to amend) for failure to jointhe United States as a required party.
On October 24, 2014, the Tribe filed an amended answer that included a counterclaim against the Commonwealth and counterclaims against three third-party defendants (all of whom are officials of the Commonwealth). Plaintiff and third-party defendants have moved to dismiss the counterclaims on the grounds of sovereign immunity (as to the counterclaims against the Commonwealth) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
For the reasons stated below, the motions of the Tribe will be denied and the motion of counterclaim-defendants will be granted in part and denied in part.
We posted motions to dismiss here. Materials on the state court removal and remand motions here. Complaint here.
You might see a lot of Michigan here (here’s another), and that’s thanks to MIFPA.
v.
#16 Federal Indian law preemption
The Chehalis/Great Wolf Lodge matter from 2013 helped bring federal Indian law preemption back from the dead. The State of Washington was still feeling the consequences this year. The real impact may be in the BIA leasing regulations.
# 8 Rule 19
My favorite FRCP. Lots of Rule 19 action again this year, including a close call at the Supreme Court, which denied cert in the Buena Vista matter. Other cases involved Jamul Indian Village, payday lending cases, and Skokomish.
Here. Like its earlier decision, today’s amended opinion concludes that the district court erroneously granted the State’s request for a preliminary injunction and held that the State’s complaint, which alleged class III gaming activities on non-Indian lands, failed to state a claim under IGRA.
The Tenth Circuit also reiterated that arbitration provisions in the state’s gaming compact effectively barred Oklahoma from suing tribal officials in federal court for purported violations of the compact. The court remanded the matter to the Northern District of Oklahoma with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction and to dismiss Oklahoma’s complaint with prejudice.
Also, the court denied the petition for en banc review.
Turtle Talk 
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