Rule 19

Federal Court Dismisses Town of Browning v. Sharp, States Town Has Tribal Court Remedy

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Town of Browning v. Sharp (D. Mont.):

71 Sharp 12b1 Motion to Dismiss

73 Sharp 12b6 Motion to Dismiss

75 Sharp 12b7 Motion to Dismiss

95 Town Response to 71

96 Town Response to 73

97 Town Response to 75

115 Sharp Reply in Support of 75

156 Magistrate Recommendation

162 DCT Order

An excerpt:

No adequate alternative forum exists to address the Town of Browning’s ex Parte Young action. The Blackfeet Tribal Court appears to represent an adequate alternative forum, however, to address the ongoing dispute between the Blackfeet Tribe and the Town of Browning. Indeed, in the Blackfeet Tribal Court, the Town of Browning can litigate against the Blackfeet Tribe directly rather than through an ex Parte Young action. Further, the Town of Browning appears to have moderated its position regarding the relief that it seeks. (Doc. 159). The Town of Browning appears to seek some reasonable compensation from the Blackfeet Tribe for use of the Town of Browning’s water main to deliver water to utility customers. The Town of Browning can seek and obtain this relief as a counterclaim in the breach of contract claim currently pending in the Blackfeet Tribal Court. Although the Town of Browning has challenged the Blackfeet Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over it on the grounds of sovereign immunity, the existence of a contract between the parties appears to confer jurisdiction on the Blackfeet Tribal Court. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). An alternative forum exists for the Town of Browning to obtain the relief it seeks.

After weighing the factors listed in Rule 19(b), this Court has determined that this case should not proceed in the absence of the Blackfeet Tribe, a required party. The potential prejudice to the Blackfeet Tribe far outweighs the harm to the Town of Browning. The Blackfeet Tribal Court represents an alternative forum for the Town of Browning to address its underlying dispute with the Blackfeet Tribe.

Materials on the preliminary injunction stage of this litigation are here.

Mesa Grande Band Land Claim against US Survives Motion to Dismiss

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Mesa Grande Band of Mission Indians v. United States (Fed. Cl.):

7 US Motion to Dismiss

10 Mesa Grande Band Response

11 US Reply

19 DCT Order

An excerpt:

This case concerns property located in the mountains of northeastern San Diego County, California, and turns on events dating back to 1875. The property at issue is an 80-acre tract (the “1926 Tract”) that has had a small spring providing a source of water in an arid area. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to the United States’ Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1, ECF No. 10. Tracing title back to a congressional enactment in 1926, the Act of May 10, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-209, 44 Stat. 496 (1926) (“1926 Act”), plaintiff, the Mesa Grande Band of Mission Indians (“Mesa Grande Band”), claims entitlement to ownership of the subject property. On July 30, 1980, however, a patent for the 1926 Tract was issued by the Department of the Interior to the United States in trust for the Santa Ysabel Band of Mission Indians (“Santa Ysabel Band”), a neighboring band. The Mesa Grande Band did not contemporaneously receive notice of the patent’s issuance.

Update in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the new materials in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri (E.D. Cal.):

60-1 Jamul Action Committee Motion for PI

62 Tribal Opposition to Motion for PI

63 NIGC Opposition to Motion for PI

67 Jamul Action Committee Reply

75-1 Rosales & Toggery Motion to File Amicus

75-2 Rosales & Toggery Amicus Brief

83 Tribal Opposition

84 NIGC Opposition

92 DCT Order Denying Amicus Motion

Previous postings here and here.

Oklahoma v. Hobia Cert Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here:

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (as filed)

Question presented:

Does Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014), require the dismissal of a State’s suit to prevent tribal officers from conducting gaming that would be unlawful under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and a state-tribal compact when

• the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief has been brought against tribal officials – not the tribe;
• the gaming will occur in Indian country, on the land of another tribe; and

• the state-tribal compact’s arbitration provision does not require arbitration before filing suit?

Lower court materials here.

Sault Tribe Motion to Dismiss Michigan Gaming Suit

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the new materials in the case captioned State of Michigan v. Payment (W.D. Mich.):

2015-03-20 Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

2015-03-20 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

71 Michigan Response to Motion to Dismiss

72 Sault Tribe Reply

The state’s amended complaint is here.

Federal Court Denies San Juan County’s Motion to Dismiss Navajo Nation’s Voting Rights Case

Matthew L.M. Fletcher3 Comments

Here are the materials in Navajo Nation v. San Juan County (D. Utah):

98 San Juan County Motion to Dismiss

99 Navajo Nation Motion for Partial Summary J — Fourth Claim

100 Navajo Nation Motion for Partial Summary J — Second and Third Claims

101 Navajo Nation Opposition to 98

104 San Juan County 56d Motion

105 San Juan County Reply re 98

166 Memorandum Decision and Order

An excerpt:

Having established subject-matter jurisdiction and the joinder of all necessary parties, the court finds that Navajo Nation has provided “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). It has thus satisfied the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(c) further states that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed–but early enough not to delay trial–a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The court finds no basis on which San Juan County would be entitled to judgment on the merits on the basis of this briefing.

Diné CARE Prevails in NEPA Challenge to Navajo Mine Expansion

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in  Diné Citizens against Ruining Our Environment v. United States Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (D. Colo.):

48 Diné CARE Opening Brief

53 OSMRE Response

54 BHP Navajo Response

55 Diné CARE Reply

79 DCT Order

News coverage here.

Posts on prior motion to dismiss and motion to intervene.

Federal Court Dismisses Challenge to Quinault Lease under Rule 19, Sovereign Immunity

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Comenout v. Whitener (W.D. Wash.):

1 Complaint

2 Motion for TRO

19 Motion to Dismiss

21 Response

24 Reply

25 DCT Order Dismissing Complaint

An excerpt:

The Nation is an indispensible party under Rule 19(b). As discussed above, a judgment in Comenout’s favor would prejudice the Nation’s contractual rights under the lease. Comenout also cannot be accorded complete relief in the Nation’s absence because any injunction would not be binding on the Nation. Further, the relief sought by Comenout cannot be shaped to lessen the potential prejudice to either Comenout or the Nation. Partial relief is also inadequate, because the Nation could still attempt to enforce its rights to use the property for commercial purposes as the lessee.

Federal Court Applies Sherrill Defenses, Tribal Immunity to Dismiss Wolfchild Statutory Land Claims

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the order in Wolfchild v. Redwood County (D. Minn.):

196 DCT Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

An excerpt:

The Court finds no basis upon which to distinguish this case from those asserted in Sherrill or Stockbridge. It is clear that Plaintiffs’ claims flow from the 1863 Act. It is also clear that the land at issue here was sold to third parties no later than 1895. See Wolfchild IX, 731 F.3d at 1293. Plaintiffs’ claims are thus like those described in Stockbridge: “Indian land claims asserted generations after an alleged dispossession that are inherently disruptive of state and local governance and the settled expectations of current landowners and are subject to dismissal on the basis of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.” Id. 756 F.3d at 165.

There is no language in Sherrill or Stockbridge that would limit the holdings of those decisions to claims based on aboriginal title.

Based on the particular characteristics and history of the claims at issue here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are equitably barred. Application of the equitable bar set forth inSherrill does not require a balancing of equities between the parties. Instead, the equitable bar focuses on Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking relief, and the disruption that would result to settled and justified expectations regarding land ownership. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216‐17, 221(finding that “the Oneidasʹ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate”).

Briefs are here.

Massachusetts Gaming Claims against Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Survive Motions to Dismiss; Counterclaims Do, Too

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the updated materials in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) (D. Mass.):

65 Massachusetts Opposition to Rule 19 Motion

67 Aquinnah-Gay Head Community Opposition to 11th Amendment Motion to Dismiss

71 Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Reply in Support of Rule 19 Motion

72 Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds

77 Massachusetts Motion to Dismiss

86 Massachusetts Officials Motion to Dismiss

87 Wampanoag Tribe Opposition to Massachusetts Immunity Motion

88 Massachusetts Reply

95 DCT Order Denying Motions to Dismiss

An excerpt:

This lawsuit involves a dispute between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a federally recognized Indian tribe concerning regulatory jurisdiction over civil gaming on Indian lands on Martha’s Vineyard. The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) and related entities have taken steps to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal lands without a license from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth contends that operating gaming facilities without such a license would violate a 1983 settlement agreement that subjects the lands in question to state civil and criminal jurisdiction (and thus subjects them to state laws regulating gaming). Count 1 of the complaint alleges breach of contract, and Count 2 seeks a declaratory judgment.

The Commonwealth filed suit in state court on December 2, 2013. On December 30, 2013, the Tribe removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal-question and supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. On August 6, 2014, the Court granted motions to intervene by the Town of Aquinnah and the Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association (“AGHCA”). The Tribe has moved to dismiss the AGHCA complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; it has further moved to dismiss all three complaints (with leave to amend) for failure to join the United States as a required party.

On October 24, 2014, the Tribe filed an amended answer that included a counterclaim against the Commonwealth and counterclaims against three third-party defendants (all of whom are officials of the Commonwealth). Plaintiff and third-party defendants have moved to dismiss the counterclaims on the grounds of sovereign immunity (as to the counterclaims against the Commonwealth) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

For the reasons stated below, the motions of the Tribe will be denied and the motion of counterclaim-defendants will be granted in part and denied in part.

We posted motions to dismiss here. Materials on the state court removal and remand motions here. Complaint here.