Tenth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of ICRA Habeas Petition for Failure to Exhaust Tribal Remedies

Here are the materials in Valenzuela v. Silversmith, arising out of the Tohono O’odham Nation courts:

CA10 Opinion

Valenzuela Opening Brief

TON Answer Brief

Warden Answer Brief

Valenzuela Reply Brief

An excerpt:

Alvin Valenzuela, an enrolled member of the Tohono O’odham Nation (the “Nation”), through counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 seeking relief from tribal court convictions and his sentence. While Mr. Valenzuela’s petition was pending in federal district court, he completed his sentence and was released from prison. The district court concluded that Mr. Valenzuela’s claims were moot because of his release. Alternatively, it concluded that Mr. Valenzuela had failed to exhaust his tribal remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court. Based on these alternative grounds, the district court dismissed Mr. Valenzuela’s § 1303 petition. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm on the ground that Mr. Valenzuela failed to exhaust his tribal court remedies and remand for the district court to dismiss his § 1303 petition without prejudice.

Tribal Justice Newsletter from US Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Oklahoma

Here:

Tribal Justice – Issue 2 FINAL

Michigan COA Denies Nottawaseppi Huron Band Motion to Intervene in ICWA Case

Here is the opinion:

In re ENM

Briefs (Complete) in Montana SCT Case Involving Transfer of Bison Herd to Fort Peck Reservation

Here are the materials in Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier:

Environmental Appellant Brief

State Appellant Brief

Fort Peck Amicus Brief

Appellee Brief

Environmental Reply Brief

State Reply Brief

Ninth Circuit Affirms Tribal Immunity from Antitrust Claims relating to Tribal Tax Agreement

Here is the opinion and materials in Miller v. Wright.

The court’s syllabus:

Affirming the district court’s dismissal of an antitrust action brought by cigarette vendors challenging taxes imposed by virtue of the authority vested in an Indian tribe, the panel held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in light of the tribe’s sovereign immunity. The panel held that the tribe did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity by agreeing to dispute resolution procedures nor by ceding its authority to Washington State when entering into a cigarette tax contract. The panel also held that federal antitrust law did not explicitly abrogate tribal immunity, and the Sherman Antitrust Act was not a law of general applicability vis-a-vis the tribe. The panel held that tribal officials were protected by the tribe’s sovereign immunity because they acted pursuant to the tribe’s authority. The panel also affirmed the district court’s alternative ruling that the action was barred by res judicata in light of prior litigation in state and tribal courts.

Here are the briefs:

Miller Opening Brief

Puyallup Answer Brief

Miller Reply Brief

Lower court materials here.

Update in Michigan’s Suit against Sault Tribe and Lansing Casino Proposal

The tribe has moved to dismiss and to oppose the State’s request for a preliminary injunction.

Sault Tribe Motion to Dismiss

Sault Tribe Response to Motion for PI

The complaint is here.

News coverage is here.

NARF Seeks D.C. Attorney Litigation and Legislative Affairs

Details here.

NYTs Article on Indian Country Crime and Lack of Federal Support to Fight It

Here.

Updated Materials on Proposal to Amend/Repeal Section 1500

Here:

NCAI letter on 28 U S C § 1500 to DOJ

Section 1500 Letter w_Attachments 11_9_12

Nez Perce Tribe Comments to DOJ 11_09_12

Defs Post-Hearing Brief inSuuport of Sec 1500 Dismissal CFC 02_28_08

1500 Filing Facts 11_01_12

Prior posts here and here.

Supreme Court Decides Question involving Federal Immunity and the Little Tucker Act

Here is today’s opinion in United States v. Bormes.

An excerpt from Justice Scalia’s unanimous opinion:

[The Federal Circuit] distorted our case law in applying to FCRA the immunity-waiver standard we expressed in White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S., at 472: whether the statute “‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’ ” 626 F. 3d, at 578. That is the test for determining whether a statute that imposes an obligation but does not provide the elements of a cause of action qualifies for suit under the Tucker Act—more specifically, whether the failure to perform an obligation undoubtedly imposed on the Federal Government creates a right to monetary relief. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, supra; Mitchell II, 463 U. S. 206. That test is not relevant when a “mandate of compensation” is contained in a statute that provides a detailed judicial remedy against those who are subject to its requirements. FCRA is such a statute. By using the “fair interpretation” test to determine whether FCRA’s civil liability provisions apply to the United States, the Federal Circuit directed the test to a purpose for which it was not designed and leapfrogged the threshold concern that the Tucker Act cannot be superimposed on an existing remedial scheme.