IGRA

Decision in Tulalip Tribes v. Washington

Kate Fort2 Comments

Opinion here.

Previous coverage here.

Our conclusion is consonant with our instruction in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes that courts should hold compacting parties to the ordinary meaning of terms in their agreements. Id. at 1098–100. The plain language of the Spokane Compact shows that the Inter-Tribal Fund mechanism available to the Spokane Tribe carries with it interdependent conditions and consequences. Tulalip’s amendment would not match those terms. We take no view on whether the terms of Appendix Spokane are in fact more favorable than those included in the Tulalip Compact. We hold simply that Tulalip is not entitled as a matter of law to the more selective set of terms in its proposed amendment.2 The most-favored tribe clause does not allow a “pick and choose” arrangement. The district court correctly entered judgment for the State. Simply put, Tulalip’s proposal does not mirror the restrictions of Appendix Spokane, and those are the terms to which the State agreed.

NIGC Prevails in Dispute with City of Duluth over the Fond du Luth Casino

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

The D.C. District Court granted the NIGC’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the City’s APA challenge to the Fond-du-Luth NOV. Here is the order in City of Duluth v. National Indian Gaming Commission (D. D.C.):

APA case — District Court Op. (March 31 2015)

An excerpt:

Plaintiff City of Duluth, Minnesota, brings this action challenging a Notice of Violation (“NOV”) that the National Indian Gaming Commission (the “Commission”) issued to the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the “Band”) with respect to Band’s gaming establishment in the City of Duluth. This action is the latest step in a long saga pertaining to the relationship of the Band and the City of Duluth with respect to gaming, including proceedings in federal court in Minnesota, before the National Indian Gaming Commission, and, now, before this Court as well. In a nutshell, in the NOV, issued July 12, 2011, the National Indian Gaming Commission informed the Band that the 1994 Agreement between the Band and the City of Duluth violated the requirement that the Band have the “sole proprietary interest” in the gaming activity pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. The City of Duluth filed this action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that the NOV, first, was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law, and, second, exceeded Defendants’ authority under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The City of Duluth requests that the NOV be set aside and requests related declaratory and injunctive relief. The Federal Defendants—the Commission and Jonodev Chaudhuri, in his official capacity as Acting Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission—argue that the NOV neither was arbitrary or capricious nor exceeded the scope of the Commission’s authority. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s [24] Motion for Summary Judgment and the Federal Defendants’ [26] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s [24] Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS the Federal Defendants’ [26] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court concludes that the NOV was not arbitrary or capricious; that it did not exceed the scope of the Commission’s authority; and that none of the other legal infirmities that Plaintiff identifies are grounds for setting aside the NOV. Accordingly, this case is dismissed in its entirety.

Briefs are here.

Oklahoma v. Hobia Cert Petition

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here:

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (as filed)

Question presented:

Does Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014), require the dismissal of a State’s suit to prevent tribal officers from conducting gaming that would be unlawful under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and a state-tribal compact when

• the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief has been brought against tribal officials – not the tribe;
• the gaming will occur in Indian country, on the land of another tribe; and

• the state-tribal compact’s arbitration provision does not require arbitration before filing suit?

Lower court materials here.

North Fork Rancheria Sues California Alleging Violation of IGRA Good Faith Negotiation Obligation

Matthew L.M. Fletcher2 Comments

Here is the complaint in North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California v. State of California (E.D. Cal.):

1 Complaint

An excerpt:

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) requires states, upon request by an Indian tribe, to “negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into” “a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities” on the tribe’s “Indian lands.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). IGRA also confers jurisdiction on this Court over “any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith.” Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). This action is brought pursuant to § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) and seeks a declaration that Defendant the State of California (“the State” or “California”) has failed to comply with § 2710(d)(3)(A)’s requirement that the State negotiate in good faith with Plaintiff North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California (“the Tribe”) to enter into an enforceable tribal-state gaming compact, and an order directing the State to conclude an enforceable compact with the Tribe within 60 days or submit to mediation, see id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)-(iv).

Sault Tribe Motion to Dismiss Michigan Gaming Suit

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here are the new materials in the case captioned State of Michigan v. Payment (W.D. Mich.):

2015-03-20 Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

2015-03-20 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

71 Michigan Response to Motion to Dismiss

72 Sault Tribe Reply

The state’s amended complaint is here.

Kansas Sues NIGC over Quapaw Indian Lands Opinion

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Here is the complaint in State of Kansas v. National Indian Gaming Commission (D. Kan.):

1 Complaint

An excerpt:

In this action, the Plaintiffs challenge and seek relief from the November 21, 2014 determination of National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) officials that a 124 acre strip of land in Kansas acquired by the Quapaw Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma (Quapaw or the Tribe) and put into trust by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for non-gaming purposes qualifies for gaming under the “last recognized reservation exception” to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s (IGRA) general prohibition on gaming on land acquired after October 17, 1988. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a)(2)(B); 25 C.F.R. § 292.4(b)(2).

Plaintiffs are aggrieved by the November 21, 2014 determination because the strip of land was taken into trust by the Department of Interior for non-gaming purposes and because the NIGC incorrectly applied 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(2)(B), thereby depriving the State of Kansas of the governor’s statutory right to concur in and to veto gaming on lands acquired after October 17, 1988, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A)

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Held in Contempt over Gaming

Kate Fort

Order here.

Materials here.

Massachusetts Gaming Claims against Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Survive Motions to Dismiss; Counterclaims Do, Too

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the updated materials in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) (D. Mass.):

65 Massachusetts Opposition to Rule 19 Motion

67 Aquinnah-Gay Head Community Opposition to 11th Amendment Motion to Dismiss

71 Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Reply in Support of Rule 19 Motion

72 Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss on Immunity Grounds

77 Massachusetts Motion to Dismiss

86 Massachusetts Officials Motion to Dismiss

87 Wampanoag Tribe Opposition to Massachusetts Immunity Motion

88 Massachusetts Reply

95 DCT Order Denying Motions to Dismiss

An excerpt:

This lawsuit involves a dispute between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a federally recognized Indian tribe concerning regulatory jurisdiction over civil gaming on Indian lands on Martha’s Vineyard. The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) and related entities have taken steps to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal lands without a license from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth contends that operating gaming facilities without such a license would violate a 1983 settlement agreement that subjects the lands in question to state civil and criminal jurisdiction (and thus subjects them to state laws regulating gaming). Count 1 of the complaint alleges breach of contract, and Count 2 seeks a declaratory judgment.

The Commonwealth filed suit in state court on December 2, 2013. On December 30, 2013, the Tribe removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal-question and supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. On August 6, 2014, the Court granted motions to intervene by the Town of Aquinnah and the Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association (“AGHCA”). The Tribe has moved to dismiss the AGHCA complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; it has further moved to dismiss all three complaints (with leave to amend) for failure to join the United States as a required party.

On October 24, 2014, the Tribe filed an amended answer that included a counterclaim against the Commonwealth and counterclaims against three third-party defendants (all of whom are officials of the Commonwealth). Plaintiff and third-party defendants have moved to dismiss the counterclaims on the grounds of sovereign immunity (as to the counterclaims against the Commonwealth) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

For the reasons stated below, the motions of the Tribe will be denied and the motion of counterclaim-defendants will be granted in part and denied in part.

We posted motions to dismiss here. Materials on the state court removal and remand motions here. Complaint here.

Guest Post: Bill Rastetter on Judge Enslen

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

From long-time Grand Traverse Band counsel Bill Rastetter on the passing of Judge Enslen:

Writing this helps me to reflect upon not just Richard Enslen but also the two other Western District judges appointed by Jimmy Carter — all of whom made major rulings for Grand Traverse Band.  (There’s a story there, if I ever could find the time; I’d start the story by talking with Dean Robb who was in the group of lawyers picked by the two Democratic Senators who came up with a list of possible nominees, including “progressives” who never would be considered in the present climate.)  Those three were Richard Enslen, Douglas Hillman, and Benjamin Gibson.  In retrospect, each individual evidenced concern for the plight of the less advantaged, the powerless within our society; and GTB’s victories might not have occurred if they had not been on the bench.

Gibson left Michigan long before retirement age, but not before he granted GTB its first victory in the modern (restored) era: Leelanau Indians, Inc. and Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (W.D. Mich. File No. G 80-526): 502 F.Supp. 741 (W.D. Mich. 1980).

Hillman?  Well, there’s the major case [Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Michigan, et al. (W.D. Mich. File No. 1:96-CV-466): 198 F.Supp.2d 920 (W.D. Mich. 2002), and 46 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d. 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004)] which easily could have been resolved differently if another judge had been assigned that case.*

And Enslen.  Even before the “treaty-fishing” cases, he granted the judgment declaring that GTB controlled the Peshawbestown lands. [Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Leelanau County and Leelanau Indians, Inc. (W.D. Mich. File No. G 83-834)]  Attached is his unpublished opinion; it’s the only time my proposed findings and conclusions have been adopted verbatim (without even being retyped).  And he was assigned the GTB v. BIA case [Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, et al. (W.D. Mich. File No. G 85-382)], by which we (with his help/not so subtle messages to DOJ that he’d grant preliminary injunction for us if …) held them (the Reagan administration DOI political operatives) at bay until Buddy Raphael negotiated the “compromise” membership provisions.  Both the 1985 and 2000 consent decrees were the result of his commitment to ADR (and at various times he forcefully let lawyers for state/”sports” groups know that they really didn’t want to give him a chance to rule for the Tribes); likewise, he allowed the Tribes plenty of maneuvering room leading up to the 2007 “inland” consent decree.  Also his July 15, 1986 opinion/order in which he fashioned a remedy in GTB’s favor when the other COTFMA Tribes (BMIC & SSM) decided they could distribute 1985 CD funds by majority vote (subsequently there have been equal 1/3 and then 1/5 distributions of appropriated funds above each Tribe’s base).  Finally, of course, is GTB’s “access” case now in the textbooks: Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Director, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, et al. (W.D. Mich. File No. 1:94-CV-707): 971 F.Supp. 282 (1995), aff’d. 141 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1124, 102 S.Ct. 971 (1998).

____________________

* Here is an article that appeared later in the New Yorker, written by his niece about his mother.  I was struck by the passage on the last page.  Here was a man who rose to the top of a prestigious G.R. law firm, probably relatively conservative albeit a Democrat in conservative G.R. and (I think) a labor lawyer, but I’m not aware of any indication that he was champion of the downtrodden.  Perhaps his mother instilled a sense of (in)justice, and when the opportunity presented itself he saved the day for the Indian Tribes. [United States v. Bay Mills Indian Community, et al. (W.D. Mich. File No. M 85-335): 692 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1988), vacated 727 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1989)]  GTB gets no credit for Judge Hillman’s decision not to enjoin the Tribes’ casino gaming, yet it was our separate brief (and affidavits of Buddy Raphael and Barry Burtt) that argued Rule 65 equitable considerations weighed against the injunction requested by DOJ.

Forest County Potawatomi Complaint re: Denial of Class III Gaming Compact — And Commentary

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

The Forest County Potawatomi Community has filed a complaint against the Department of the Interior over the disapproval of its gaming compact – the latest development in the Menominee Tribe’s efforts to develop a class III gaming facility in Kenosha, Wisconsin.

Here are some initial thoughts about the case:

  1. These are very difficult cases to win. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, federal agencies have broad discretion in making decisions and interpreting statutory law.  The Department’s decision to disapprove the Forest County Potawatomi gaming compact strikes me as consistent with its approach in recent years to limit the scope of these types of agreements.
  2.  The Complaint alleges that the Department’s rejection of the compact “departed from long-established and consistent policies reflected in previous [compact] decisions…” However, the Department of the Interior has always expressed concerns over revenue sharing in gaming compacts.  In the past 15 years, the Department has also warned tribes that gaming compacts are not an appropriate means to restrict the ability of other Indian tribes to engage in gaming under IGRA – including the Forest County Potawatomi Community.  Finally, the Department of the Interior under the Obama Administration has rejected a number of gaming compacts for similar reasons.
  3. The Complaint alleges that “Potawatomi has not received what it bargained for:…the 50-mile non-competition zone.” Later, it asserts that “[Potawatomi] has paid the State over $243 million” for that benefit.  This sounds like Potawatomi intends the new compact to remedy the old compact’s supposed flaws, which is a tough sell considering the fact that the Forest County Potawatomi Community has enjoyed the exclusive right to operate a gaming facility in Milwaukee for more than two decades.  
  4. The Department’s decision to disapprove the Forest County Potawatomi gaming compact was based on its determination that the compact included terms that went far beyond what IGRA allows. The Complaint alleges that determination was wrong, and states, “IGRA expressly provides that a compact may include provisions that take into account the adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activities” and then cites 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(iii)(I) and 2710 (d)(3)(C)(vii).  Nothing in either of those sections of IGRA “expressly” allows a compact to include terms that mitigate a tribal gaming facility for lost profits.  The Department is going to get a lot of deference on its interpretation of those sections.
  5. The Complaint alleges that the Department had “a ministerial duty to approve the [Potawatomi] Compact amendment” because it was the product of an earlier compact amendment that survived the Department’s review. This is, perhaps, the biggest stretch in the complaint.  A court could see that argument as an effort to allow tribes and states to collude to avoid DOI review of gaming compact amendments.

Gaming compacts have become increasingly more complex, and the Department of the Interior has become much more active in reviewing those agreements.  This will be a difficult case for Forest County Potawatomi to win, as I suspect the Court will defer to the Department’s expertise in this area. All in all, there are lot of interesting questions for the court to consider in this matter.

Here are related documents:

1-1 Exhibit A — Compact Amendment

1-2 Exhibit B — Disapproval Letter